With its emphasis on 'smart environments', the vision of pervasive computing raises critical concerns with respect to consent. When sensors capture data about people, and digital systems interpret and respond to that data below the line of user visibility, two fundamental questions arise. First, are current notions of consent relevant in the emerging class of pervasive systems and, secondly, what are the practical consequences of dealing with consent for such environments? This paper reflects on the key principles of consent and the challenges raised by pervasive systems through a review of multidisciplinary perspectives on consent and technology. The developing complexity and decreasing visibility of pervasive computing systems, coupled with the increasing value and sensitivity of personal data, mean that it is no longer sufficient to design systems that assume users capable of making informed decisions at a single moment. In particular, the unprecedented sensitivity of contextual data, and the potential harms associated with inferences made on the basis of that data, highlights the need to revisit our design principles. Many of these discussions are nuanced and implicate a broad range of perspectives; however, it is clear that there is unlikely to be a 'moment of consent' in pervasive systems. In order to progress this agenda we offer the following set of recommendations to designers, as considerations for future systems design: (i) electronic consent mechanisms (ECMs) must cease to be designed around 'moments in time' and allow for negotiation, (ii) systems should enable establishment of user expectations and development of norms, (iii) systems should be sensitive to thirdparty interactions and (iv) we should move beyond designing for user control towards designing for user autonomy.
INTRODUCTION
We are all familiar with that moment when we access an on-line service and are presented with pages of terms of conditions whilst being asked to click 'I agree'. This interaction represents the moment of consent, where a user indicates that they have understood the various restrictions enumerated within the multiple pages of a document, and accepted them.
Given that terms and conditions for many popular sites are longer than some of Shakespeare's plays (Parris, 2012) , there are significant issues as to the extent to which this approach provides information in a manner that is readily understood by, and genuinely informs users. Indeed, existing approaches to electronic consent management (ECM) for on-line services (Bonnici and Coles-Kemp, 2010) have being critiqued for the 230 Ewa Luger and Tom Rodden way in which users tend to consent without understanding what they are agreeing to, and the way in which some ECMs place emphasis upon management of data only after the fact of consent, thus by-passing issues raised at the point of consent itself.
Despite the debate surrounding the consent process applied in existing internet service provision, this approach has the advantage that there is a clear interactional moment. This moment provides an opportunity to inform users about the nature of the service with which they are about to engage and to gain agreement from them a priori. Equally, the user has an unambiguous moment where consent is requested and when they can reflect on the nature of the service and implications of use.
As we enter a growing 'era of ubiquity' in which computational devices and services surround us, consent becomes ever more difficult both for the users and for designers of those services. Computers increasingly and continuously gather and exploit personal information generated during our daily interactions in the world. Subsequently, identifying the point at which a user might be both informed of the nature of ubiquitous services, and subsequently consent to their data demands, becomes increasingly problematic.
The challenge of pervasive systems
Underpinning the growth in context-aware ubiquitous computing systems is a drive to 'decouple users from devices' (Hong et al., 2009) in order to create effectively 1 seamless and responsive experiences. Such decoupling, whilst easing the physical and cognitive burden upon the user, and enhancing system responsiveness, is also likely to see a reduction in user agency, understood as the 'operation of social power located in the actions and behaviour of human individuals' (Price, 1997, p. 11) , particularly in the sphere of privacy protection. Effectively, if these pervasive services are designed to be invisible, it seems somewhat incongruous that they might (a) continually prompt individuals with (b) many pages of information, about (c) the nature of the service built into the world around them, and (d) expect an explicit sign that the individual understands and agrees.
What makes the issue of consent particularly challenging and important for pervasive systems is that they capture and exploit information about individuals' activities in the world and draw upon this information. Personal information is often gathered implicitly, through a range of sensing devices and technologies, without people being aware that this information is being collected. Indeed, ubiquitous sensing technologies are designed to be unobtrusive. The presumption of access to personal information also underpins the delivery of contextual services within pervasive systems. The availability of this information as a resource essentially means that it is drawn upon, by services that were not responsible for its initial collection, often for purposes other than those originally proposed. This paper explores the appropriateness of current conceptions of consent in the context of pervasive data-driven systems, and makes recommendations for further research. It does so first through an exploration of why consent matters within such systems, and the unique characteristics of pervasive computing. It then moves to look at work related to ECM systems to highlight the weaknesses inherent in current approaches. Having established the problem, the paper then explains the contemporary origins of consent and its principle tenets, followed by a series of challenges that current conceptions of consent present to the pervasive computing context. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these challenges and a series of recommendations for further research.
WHY CONSENT MATTERS IN PERVASIVE SYSTEMS
Why is it so important that pervasive computing systems respond to the challenge of user consent? Computing systems have already pervaded our lives so as to be not only partially invisible, but also interwoven within the fabric of our everyday activities. This is further complicated by the speed of innovation and integration, which has occurred at such a rate as to leave questions of ethics, social acceptance, and political and legislative responses milling in its wake. The power of such socially embedded systems is to capture seemingly innocuous everyday activity and not only build detailed models of users but also to infer their future behaviour. This draws us to question whether the ways in which we currently think about user consent truly meet the demands of these developing social environments. To highlight the point, we need to look only towards a series of very practical everyday examples that illustrate the features of pervasive systems. From these perspectives it becomes clear that what may seem superficially benign at the point of design is considerably less so in context. Pervasive systems routinely speak of adapting to users' contexts. This adaptation is based on inferring a particular context, from a range of data sources, and using this to construct user profiles and to predict current and future activities (Schnädelbach et al., 2008; Duhigg, 2012; Chen, 2011) . The algorithms underpinning these systems are already familiar to us in the form of the customer loyalty card. Originally, the intention of such cards was to stimulate customers to exhibit preference and commitment to a given store and subsequently alter their behaviour to repeat purchase (Demoulina and Ziddab, 2008) . However, a recent article in the NewYork Times magazine (Duhigg, 2012) highlights just how companies can use that data. According to Andrew Pole, an economist working for (Fox News, 2012) Target 2 , not only does the store keep all granular data related to an individual, but also that data can then be used to not only target advertising, as one might expect, but also to predict major life events. Even those events one Terms of Agreement: Rethinking Consent for Pervasive Computing 231 might otherwise wish to keep private. In the case of Target, this included the successful identification of the first trimester of pregnancy on the basis of early purchasing patterns. Similarly, Visa can reportedly predict whether customers will divorce within 2 years, with a terrifying 98% accuracy (Burkeman, 2011) . Furthermore, algorithms have also been developed that can infer sexual orientation with up to 80% accuracy (Giles, 2012) .
If predictive analytics departments have become the engines of private sector marketing, then user data are the fuel; a newly constructed asset class, equated to oil by the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2011) . Personal information is now digitised, multidimensional and permanent, collected and limitlessly stored and analysed in increasingly sophisticated ways. This enhances both its potential availability and its comodification, resulting in 'life in all its walks [being] constituted as productive labour' (Arvidsson, 2004, p. 468) representing a unique post-industrial and global opportunity for monetisation (World Economic Forum, 2011) .
Pervasive systems mean that we will increasingly live with algorithms, drawing upon a growing volume of data that are harvested from our activities in the world. Whilst this impacts all members of society, it is particularly likely to further compound existing inequalities amongst those already experiencing disenfranchisement. Digital exclusion correlates positively with unemployment and lower education levels (Helsper, 2008) . It is therefore unlikely that individuals suffering such exclusion will have sufficient experience to understand the function and implications of pervasive systems. Without such understanding it is not possible to make meaningful consent choices, leaving one particularly vulnerable to exploitation.
Pervasive systems also often exploit quite detailed models of people and their preferences to make choices about the user's context. The harvesting of this form of information is already a routine feature of our interactions within computer systems. In 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) disclosed that, during their routine data collection activities, Google Street View cars captured not only visual data, but also households' emails, URLs and passwords through their wireless networks (Arthur, 2012) . Whilst this privacy breach was described as accidental, there is little denying that the company has an interest in individual-level data. The business model favoured by Google depends upon linked services to facilitate the development of individual data profiles to more effectively target advertising. Changes in their privacy policy mean that this draws together not only Google products, such as Gmail, but also information about individual searches whilst you are logged on (BBC News, 2012) . Suddenly your interests, communications, purchases and affiliations are amalgamated into a unique profile of you as an individual.
Pervasive systems draw upon information sensed about our activities and endeavours in the real world. The rapid growth of location-based services represents only the start of this increasing shift to understanding people's physical activities in the world as a means to configure services. In 2011, data scientists discovered that Apple collected and stored 10 months of time-stamped location data, saved on user's devices in an easily accessible unencrypted file (Chen, 2011) . According to Apple, the reason for this was to enable them to offer comprehensive and efficient location services. However, any phone theft could have resulted in an exposure of the user's precise movements. Equally, even if you opt out of location services yourself, social networks such as Twitter and Facebook can predict your location with reasonable accuracy based upon your friends' location data or addresses. According to research from the University of Rochester, 'if just nine of a person's friends attach GPS tags to their tweets, around half of the time it is possible to pinpoint that person to within a 100-metre radius' (Giles, 2012, p. 42) . This means that even if we do not consent to a specific disclosure ourselves we are, by default, consenting by association.
As well as capturing information about the individual, pervasive systems are embedded in a social world, where both casually shared and more formally collective interactions mean that an individual's data are less clearly demarked. Equally reliance upon inferred consent, as implied by a user simply interacting with a system, is no longer valid where such systems collect data invisibly. The shared nature of the world means that information captured about an individual might be available to others and the means through which the information is monitored could be shared. Consider, for example, the way in which insurance companies are now using in-car monitoring devices to reward safe driving through discounted rates. If one enables such a device and consents to its collection of your data, what then happens if you lend your car to a third party? Alternatively, what if you offer your house to a third party whilst you are away, but your energy meter records usage in the house in your absence? Potentially, those third parties could engage in what they consider private behaviours (going to a clinic or choosing not to shower), but the unknowing inclusion of their data within your system would potentially publicise those acts. Alternatively, those acts could be attributed to you by the processing agents. So, the question arises; within highly embedded systems, at what point should consent occur and who is responsible for that disclosure?
As well as serving to illustrate the challenges of ubiquitous systems, these examples are notable in that none of the privacy breaches in themselves constitute harm. Equally, despite many of these examples attracting media attention, there is no rush to arms as individuals seek to defend themselves against clearly articulated risks. However, each instance constitutes an attrition of the private sphere. What if Target had posted advertising for nappies to a household within which the pregnant individual had been the 15-year-old daughter?
3 What if the GPS tracker had 232 Ewa Luger and Tom Rodden alerted one household member to the location of another and exposed infidelities? What then? Pervasive systems record and conflate the social and personal self in unprecedented and often socially unpredictable ways. They make porous the barriers between personal and public endeavours, and force into the light that which previously remained hidden. Consent is the primary mechanism that holds firm those boundaries and we would argue that such demarcations, critical to society and the self, should remain under the informed direction of the individual. However, if existing consent management mechanisms are already inadequate for existing online interactions (Bonnici and Coles-Kemp, 2010) , how can we prepare and design for such contexts?
The challenge therefore is to consider how people, surrounded by ubiquitous systems, might meaningfully think of and provide consent. When there is no obvious interaction moment a priori and information is gathered beyond the visibility of the individual, harvested from public forums and elsewhere, when and how can consent occur? To address this challenge, it is helpful to reflect on the various traditions and disciplines that have shaped consent, with a view to addressing two critical questions:
• Are current notions of consent relevant in the emerging class of pervasive systems? • What are the practical consequences of dealing with consent for such systems?
To address this challenge, we wish to revisit the conceptual foundations of consent and reflect upon how our current notions have been shaped, exploring the extent to which these are suitable for future pervasive systems. However, before considering the adequacy of our current approaches to consent, we must first understand what we mean by the term.
DEFINING CONSENT
Before looking more closely at the challenges that pervasive systems present, it is helpful to unpack what we currently mean by the term consent and to understand the contemporary influences that have shaped our understanding.
Our current conceptions of consent originate largely from reactions in the mid-twentieth century to extreme moral violations of research subjects, characterized most famously by the Nuremberg trials and subsequent code of practice. The 'Nuremberg Code' was the first formal standardization of ethical principles within this context, primary of which was the categorical requirement to secure a subject's tacit consent on the basis of four characteristics; that participation was 'voluntary, competent, informed and comprehending' (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p. 155) .
Whilst setting a clear direction, these principles failed to reflect adequately all potential application contexts. In response, the World Medical Association began to draft a more tailored ethical code. The resulting document, the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) , initiated the critical distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research and cast explicit and specific consent as a central requirement of ethical practice. Further developments in this area came in the wake of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (Corbie-Smith, 1999), which established there were no consistent or adequate governmental mechanisms for securing participant consent. The further significance of Tuskegee was that it instigated the ongoing challenge of realizing fully informed consent, particularly when working with vulnerable populations (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986) .
Whilst deriving of medical ethics, subsequent articulations of informed consent have been subject to multiple competing influences, the most dominant being law and moral philosophy. From the legal perspective, the focus is narrower and rests upon clinical rather than research practice, highlighting the liability of the individual. Moral philosophy, on the other hand, emphasises the autonomous choice of the individual, and is articulated through three principles; (a) respect for autonomy; including privacy, voluntariness, self-mastery, freedom of choice and accepting responsibility for choices, (b) beneficence, including four elements such as no infliction of evil/harm, prevention of evil/harm, removal of evil/harm and do or promote good, and (c) justice; in response to violation of rights (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, pp. 7-15) .
Though the emphases are subtly different, both perspectives (Kerr et al., 2009 ; citing Black's Law Dictionary, p. 13; Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p. 54) are essentially interwoven through the legal process and, at their core, agree that the consent choice should be (a) informed that (b) the user should be both capable of consenting and (c) free to do so, and that the act itself should be (d) un-coerced and (e) not a result of error, or (f) of fraudulent means.
RELATED WORK
Despite the growing tensions surrounding privacy and consent, very little literature within the field of information systems has explicitly covered consent as a concept in its own right (Bonnici and Coles-Kemp, 2010) . According to Curren and Kaye (2010, p. 274) , 'an individual's consent to use their personal information is the primary means for individuals to exercise their autonomy and to protect their privacy', which casts consent as a critical mechanism of privacy protection. However, despite its importance, online systems have seen it reduced to either being implied through an interaction (such as accessing a website and thereby agreeing to its conditions) or, more explicitly, through ECMs that rely on notice-giving and signalling as the instruments of agreement. Before considering consent within the context of pervasive systems, it is important to understand the limitations of these current approaches and highlight any salient developments within the literature. 
The problem with existing consent systems
Based on limited available research in the area, Bonnici and Coles-Kemp (2010) offer a categorization of ECMs, which they define as 'on-line consent management approach[es]' (Bonnici and Coles-Kemp, 2010, p. 119) , classifying them as first generation, ex-post and principled. According to the authors, first-generation ECMs include information disclosure mechanisms (e.g. End User Licence Agreements, P3P), signalling mechanisms (e.g. tick-boxes) and enforcement mechanisms (e.g. standards and legislation). In contrast, ex-post ECMs refer to systems designed to improve upon first-generation mechanisms, broadly through enhanced authentication and storage, to promote users' trust. Whilst these systems are widely used, there has been some question as to their effectiveness, particularly with respect to the extent to which users are informed prior to the consent act.
Even within traditional online environments, current mechanisms for informing and securing consent are problematic. According to Bonnici and Coles-Kemp (2010) , existing approaches to ECMs have shortfalls; first-generation ECMs secure user consent often without those users understanding what they are agreeing to, while ex-post systems place emphasis upon management after the fact of consent and thereby by-passing issues raised at the point of consent itself.
In a social sense, the physical act of a signature on a contract is 'law's signal to consumers that the document in front of them is important and that they should be cautious about agreeing to it' (Hillman and Rachlinski, 2002 p. 481) . Equally, a digital expression of consent (for example the ticking of a box to agree to Terms and Conditions) should carry the same message to users and give them pause to consider the act.
However, a survey conducted amongst 92 contract students at Cornell University found that only four of those surveyed read the standard form contracts 'as a general matter' (Hillman, 2005, p. 7) . This finding is further reinforced by the work of Bakos et al. (2009) who studied the extent that potential buyers accessed End User License Agreements (EULAs), by tracking browsing behaviour across 45 0910 households. The author found that a tiny minority, 'on the order of 0.1%' (Bakos et al., 2009, p. 29) , actually access the EULA. On the basis of these studies alone, it is clear that current consent systems do not meet the requirements of the consent process as users cannot be said to be informed prior to the consent act.
The need for principled design
Arguably, such matters could be addressed if the design proceeded from a value-driven foundation. Despite the past decade seeing a growing body of normative work around privacy and pervasive computing, consent has received largely secondary mention if at all. However, within the broader technology context, a number of projects have reinvigorated debates around consent, highlighting specific aspects. With particular reference to informed consent, Friedman et al. (2005) offered a series of value-sensitive design principles to shape the development of informed consent within online systems; disclosure, comprehension, voluntariness (non-coercion), competence, agreement and minimal distraction. Whilst the first six principles clearly reflect traditional consent components, the sixth (minimal distraction) is empirically derived from user studies and relates to the need to ensure the five prior principles without 'unduly diverting the individual from the task at hand' (Friedman et al., 2005, p. 511) .
The Principled ECM suggested by Bonnici and Coles-Kemp (2010) offers another example of value sensitive design, drawing together more closely the conceptual analysis of consent and its practical instantiation. The authors argue for a framework (consent theory, ECM norms and manifestation of those norms) on the basis that (a) principled ECM addresses consent both before and after the consent decision, (b) it considers a broad range of contributory factors such as both organizational and software processes and (c) it builds upon theory in order to enhance consistency at the point of application. It is this latter point that is of particular salience for consent as, similarly to the bioethical field, practice has drifted far from theory and its instantiation currently fails to meet both current and future requirements.
The need to challenge existing principles
It is clear that current mechanisms are insufficient to meet the requirements of consent within existing systems. Whilst very few studies have explicitly focused upon pervasive systems and consent, where they have, recommendations have tended to reflect rather than question existing design principles.
For example, whilst in a study of ubiquitous computingenhanced residential care settings, Beckwith and Lederer (2003) argue that such invisible systems effectively compromise informed consent. However, Lederer et al. (2002) maintain that ubiquitous systems should still focus upon the traditional principles of 'notice' and 'consent', despite recognizing the tension arising from the unobtrusiveness of systems as set against notice giving (Beckwith and Lederer, 2003) . As an alternative they suggest the use of end-user reviewable logs and road-sign style signage, to ensure the principle of notice and the use of symbology, or 'faces' to represent a range of user privacy preferences such as 'secure shopper, cocktail party, hanging out with friends, anonymous, family outings, travelling abroad' (p. 7).
However, whilst such suggestions offer subtly alternative consent models, they rely heavily upon existing tenets and arguably fail to question the utility of the underpinning concepts. In order to consider the suitability of consent as a concept for pervasive systems, we must first return to the underlying theoretical principles that have shaped our present views of consent and identify areas of tension.
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DISCUSSION: SEVEN CHALLENGES TO CONSENT
The following section represents the core discussion of the paper and, on the basis of a range of cross-disciplinary literature, presents a series of seven areas where the existing principles of consent are challenged within the context of pervasive systems. Our aim is to illustrate the mismatch between current views of consent and emerging pervasive systems and to identify particular places where research might tackle this divergence. The first three of our identified challenges relate to aspects of the communication act, within the consent process, and highlight
(1) the question of consent as a stable, a priori act, (2) the reliance upon current forms of 'notice', and (3) the problems inherent in the notion of informing consent.
The following two challenges speak more directly to the design of pervasive systems and suggest that (4) current designs conceptually weaken consent, and (5) the design of consent requires a level of bidirectionality not currently present.
Finally, the last two relate to the need to revisit the key related concepts, namely (6) the importance of context with respect to the public and the private, and (7) the ambiguity inherent in what we mean by control.
Challenge 1: consent as an a priori act conducted in a stable environment
Whilst consent is a requisite of data protection law, there is currently no formal definition of the term in the UK data protection act (Curren and Kaye, 2010) . Instead, the Information Commissioners Office draws its understanding from Article 2 of the European Union Data Protection Directive;
The data subject's consent' shall mean any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.
(European Union Data Protection Directive, Article 2, 1995) It is worth noting that this articulation, rather than focusing upon the conditions of consent, takes a more mechanistic approach. Whilst 'freely given' can be interpreted as relating to capability and non-coercion, the language is sufficiently vague as to be open to a lighter touch. From a theoretic perspective, however, consent is essentially a 'ritual of trust' based upon a 'propositional attitude', given in response to 'a proposition describing the action to be performed ' (O'Neill, 2003, p. 5) . This response relates to a proposed action and as such is sought in advance of that event.
Although some distinctions arise, what remains constant is that current conditions of consent are predicated on a stable relationship between clearly defined entities and that consent is sought a priori. The preconditions are that the data subject and the data processer are readily identifiable and the context of use is reasonably static and understood. However, within pervasive computing, this relationship is considerably more dynamic as the approach conflates multiple, potentially highly social, spheres of life in new and emerging ways. Equally, the system functionality increasingly relies upon multiple ongoing data-streams, making a single point of consent problematic. Consider, for example, a pervasive application that offers advice on energy conservation by monitoring your travel journey, cross relating this to your online diary, and offering advice on the greenest ways to travel. The system provides summaries of your journeys, highlighting your regular patterns, and advising how to improve that journey. While one might consent to initially providing journey information as part of a daily commute, what happens when a significant life event occurs (e.g. marriage, divorce) or we are subject to some travel restriction (e.g. as a result of a driving offence) and our relationship to this level of tracking alters.
Equally, the system functionality increasingly relies upon multiple ongoing data-streams, making a single point of consent problematic. For example, we might discover that our health insurance company also has access to this information and notes when we stop cycling regularly and start using a car for our journey to work. In light of this, it is clear that the nature of pervasive computing has drifted considerably from the theoretical framing that has informed common conceptions of consent and, as such, requires reconsideration.
Challenge 2: reliance upon 'notice' and 'privacy statements'
A further key challenge is that, within current systems, the consent-giver is at best a communication (notice) recipient rather than someone who is genuinely informed. Equally, within web-design, the accepted model is that of implicit, rather than explicit, consent. Friedman et al. (2000) warn against over-reliance upon implicit consent, defined as consent as a by-product of online interactions. Whilst widespread and seemingly innocuous, the authors argue that this may be considered coercive (therefore, counter to the tenets of both data protection law and consent) unless the user chooses a specific system whilst having equal access to other comparable products. This drive for explicit consent is reinforced by Lederer et al. (2002) who consider 'consent' and 'notice' to be the design aspects of greatest everyday utility to the user. Whilst notice is a critical prerequisite for consent, it is the invisibility of systems that liberates us to use them 'without thinking and so to focus beyond them on new goals' (Weiser, 1991, p. 94 counter to the tenets of fair and ethical practice. Clearly, if one accepts this proposition, it is unlikely that the current digital point of consent mechanisms would be viewed as appropriate means of securing un-coerced, informed agreement. Already, the exercise of consent in practice 'is often more notional than real' (Lawson and O'Donoghue, 2009, p. 24 ). This becomes increasingly problematic when one considers the heightened value of personal data within the digital sphere both to the individual, and as disaggregate components of one's identity.
However, even if we seek consent, it is often the case that users have a distorted conception of the potential risks associated with their data sharing. If we consider notions of consent in bioethics, an area within which informed consent is both critical and protective, one of the underpinning factors in 'informing' is the effective articulation of risk; an aspect which is largely overlooked when notice is given to users within digital systems.
Furthermore, the use of language matters. According to Corrigan (2003) , subjects' perceptions of risk strongly relate to the language context; for example, 'study' is considered more benign by participants than 'experiment'. However, if language is a factor in risk perception, it is not a huge leap to assume that the heavily legalistic tenor used within traditional terms and conditions is unlikely to support informed judgement. From this perspective, existing approaches to understanding consent decisions overlook key factors; they assume that the actor possesses sufficient information about the potential harm to reach a reasoned judgment.
However, even if risk is clearly articulated, it is likely that users will still make privacy decisions based upon cognitive shortcuts. In a study of privacy behaviours within Digital Social Environments (Carey and Burkell, 2009) , it was found that where the level of risk was uncertain, and when other resources 4 were limited, individuals made use of cognitive heuristics, or 'shortcuts', in their decision-making, described as heuristic reasoning. These heuristics rely upon the feelings resulting from an action (affect heuristic), their available memory of similar events and outcomes (availability heuristic), and their perceptions of probability on the basis of mental models or stereotypes (representativeness heuristic).
Based on these dynamics, recent experiences of a threat amplify the perceptions of associated risk. Whilst 'in some cases, the use of heuristics to make decisions has been shown to produce better results than those generated by a fully rational approach' (Carey and Burkell, 2009, p. 74) , this is considerably less likely to be true where the threat associated with an act is either unknown or time-lagged. Equally, most analysis of risks by an actor occurs in an 'experiential' mode that is 'intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness' (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 311) , and it could be argued that the design of the point of consent relies upon experiential mode in order not to disrupt user experience.
The challenge of providing notice to users, of the detail of information that is being implicitly collected from them by sensors embedded in the environment, presents a major challenge in developing pervasive experiences. At one extreme, you might envisage someone's personal device being informed every time they are in a range of an embedded sensor, and that system sending a large terms and condition message to them for perusal and approval. It is, however, hard to imagine how one might live in a world where every action undertaken requires multiple terms and conditions to be accepted. It is equally hard to envisage how one might articulate and convey a notice of all future possibilities and interactions, to a user, with a pervasive computing world. The challenge then is how to develop lightweight notations that (a) convey the nature of the sensors in the world to users, (b) articulate the level of exposed risk and (c) are delivered by appropriate means.
Challenge 3: 'Informing' consent
It is becoming clear that the requirements of informed consent, as currently envisaged, raise significant challenges for the design community. However, it is not just the development of ubiquitous computing technologies that have raised substantive questions about the appropriateness of the concept as it currently stands. As clinical practice has matured, so has recognition that the biomedical context is neither uniform, nor separate from social ecology and the underpinning social norms. This perspective bears more than a passing resemblance to our understanding in respect of pervasive computing and offers a new theoretical foundation from which to proceed.
As in the digital context, Manson and O'Neill (2007) argue that the practice of securing informed consent rarely meets expected standards and that the subsequent shortfall implicitly devalues them. In response to this, the authors question the appropriateness of the concept, with particular regard to (a) the utility of the requirement to be fully explicit and completely specific in all instances of consent, (b) what is meant by autonomy of the subject and whether this is indeed an appropriate principle and (c) the weaknesses inherent in the notion of informing. Whilst these considerations relate to actions that are invasive (violation of bodily integrity) rather than intrusive (infringement of specific liberty rights), the principles are equally noteworthy in the context of pervasive systems.
As in the digital context, whilst explicit consent is often required, the reality is that consent in practice is often implicit rather than explicit; for example, the act of offering one's arm to give blood, or the act of using a website on the basis that there is a common understanding of what that implies. Also, the desire to be specific runs counter to the need to simplify or make accessible the complexity of procedures and potential outcomes to vulnerable and heterogeneous subjects.
Finally, the notion of informing is problematized through the 'conduit' and 'container' metaphors for communication, which cast communications between the consent-giver and 236 Ewa Luger and Tom Rodden the consent-seeker as abstracted from context, having 'drifted too far from action' (Manson and O'Neill, 2007, p. 50) . In reality, the act of informing is complex, highly context and norm-dependent, referentially opaque, inferentially fertile and audience-sensitive, and thereby not adequately served through traditional forms of notice.
Truly informed consent is particularly difficult within pervasive computing, given the growing prominence of autonomous systems and the embedded algorithms involved. Inherent within a pervasive computing environment is a range of often rather complex algorithms to identify and classify behaviours from low-level sensors (e.g. Orr and Abowd 2000) . Many of these are dependent on complex mathematical analytics that deal with varying levels of uncertainty and probability. The net result is that a 'smart' pervasive environment might change how it responds to an individual based on a broad set of previously observed sensor data. However, the user may not understand how this decision was arrived at, or even that this was based on a set of probabilities and uncertainties. Equally an embedded agent might infer, from a sequence of actions, a high degree of probability that an individual is likely to do something, and then act on this assumption. Finding ways of conveying that these actions will occur, and what drives them, represents a major challenge in informing users about what they are consenting to within a pervasive computing environment.
Challenge 4: impoverishing consent through design
Counter to notions of consent in theory, information sharing across data-driven systems does not always occur with the user's explicit agreement, despite 'choice' and 'consent' being accepted principles of privacy-enhanced ubicomp systems (Dritsas et al., 2006) . Equally, the concept is a largely secondary consideration within the literature around privacy enhancing practices and as such is rarely defined, even when central to the narrative, and is often reduced to a synonym for agreement.
From a design perspective, attempts to reflect the tenets of consent are few, with the emphasis tending to be upon intermediary solutions to privacy protection, such as datastores (Langheinrich, 2002) , and anonymity and pseudonymity (Dritsas et al., 2006) in order to offer an uninterrupted experience. These approaches, whilst solution-oriented, fail to acknowledge the principles of a meaningful consensual act; that should be voluntary, competent, informed and comprehending. Instead, these approaches dilute, and therefore undermine, the human knowledge and agency required for a meaningful consent act.
The dissolution of two-way interfaces that accompany emerging pervasive environments reduces further the opportunities for user agency. This means that the seeking of explicit consent is increasingly difficult and arduous, and may seem impractical from a design perspective (Soppera and Burbridge, 2004) . One possible solution may be found in the debates around seamlessness. However, the fact remains that users increasingly want to be asked for their consent (Friedman et al., 2000) and there is currently no privacy protection mechanism that allows users recourse, should they feel the level of embedded anonymity within a system is insufficient (Soppera and Burbridge, 2004) .
The issue then is how to architect future ubiquitous computing environments to embed what might be termed 'consent by design'. Current approaches to design operate on the presumption of both availability of information and that the system has permission to process the information without engaging users. However, we might envisage a future environment where consent is given the same primacy as security and that we develop models where the user is aware of the processing that takes place on their personal data. This might take the form of a personal data manager that negotiates with agents in the embedded environments, to discover the appropriate level of exposure and control. For example, as your enter a store, the environment might request an appropriate level of data collection permission with a personal manager, based on previously encoded preferences.
Challenge 5: consent is bidirectional, negotiated and revocable
Given the complexity articulated in challenge 3, it is no longer sufficient to think of informing as abstracted and unidirectional, particularly in the context of highly situated systems. Rather, in light of this, we should move to a bidirectional model based upon negotiation, construction and generation. In line with Manson and O'Neill's (2007) view of consent in bioethics, we would argue that such communicative acts, rather than being exhaustively explicit and specific ought to be (a) intelligible, (b) relevant and (c) adhere to regulative norms of truth and truthfulness. Such communications ought also to not only communicate the 'content of a proposal', but 'make a conditional commitment' (Manson and O'Neill, 2007, p. 91) . Thereby, informed consent is recast as a negotiated and very specific and context-dependant waiver of rights and obligations 'in limited ways, for a limited time, for a limited purpose' (Manson and O'Neill, 2007, p. 187) and therefore should be time-limited or revocable. Currently, there is no right of revocation within data protection law, which must be addressed if users are to have genuinely meaningful consent and revocation options, both through design (Pöhls, 2008) and through a more supportive legislative climate (Curren and Kaye, 2010) .
The work of Nissenbaum (1998 Nissenbaum ( , 2004 on Privacy also speaks clearly to the notion of negotiation and bidirectionality. Through her theory of contextual integrity, she argues for privacy as a dialectic process between agents; the information subject, the receiver and the discloser. From this perspective, the context within which a disclosure occurs is constituted by (a) norms of appropriateness and (b) norms of information flow/distribution, which govern the extent to which information is appropriate to a given context. Norms of appropriateness dictate whether disclosure of the given type of personal information is appropriate, whereas norms of information flow/distribution describe the parameters within which personal information should flow in a given context. Any departure from these norms results in a contextual breach. Coles-Kemp and Kani-Zabihi (2010) further reinforce this point arguing that, whilst there already exists something of a micro-dialogue between users and on-line service providers, this bi-direction needs to be explicitly embedded into the design of services, recasting them as socio-technical systems.
On the basis of these perspectives, accepted forms of notice such as terms and conditions, privacy policies and cookie notices cannot be said to inform in any meaningful way. Whilst online systems currently meet the basic regulatory consent standards for data protection, pervasive systems not only gather more and different data, but also use that data in different and changing ways. Suddenly, not only is the context mutable but potentially so is the content of the consent proposal.
To address this challenge, pervasive systems may need to reconsider how they capture information about users and analyse this. Essentially, pervasive systems may need to ensure that inhabitants remain connected to the information gathered about them both directly and indirectly and that this information is open and transparent to them. For example, current approaches to location tracking systems mean that a broad range of applications independently capture and store information on a person's location, once they have initial permission from the user. These applications have the rights to access and analyse this information, independently of the user, often deriving results from these data. The challenge for all these systems is providing a strong link back to the user to allow them greater access to the use of information and, when necessary, to withdraw consent.
Challenge 6: the porosity and mutability of public/private boundaries
There is growing recognition that individual control and autonomy as tenets central to data protection infrastructure may require review. As in bioethics, recent work in this sphere points beyond these principles to the importance of context in understanding divisions between the public and the private, including consideration of social norms, user expectations and the type of information being shared. However, this move represents not a grand departure but a gradual conceptual shift. As early as the 1990s, Helen Nissenbaum (1998) could be heard arguing for a normative formulation of information privacy, including considerations of non-sensitive information (drawn from the public sphere), thus addressing the potential harm arising from decontextualized (secondary or third party) use of data. As discussed in the introduction, recognizing that harm can occur when information is used in ways, not originally anticipated in the consent proposition, is particularly critical in a data-rich ubicomp setting.
This relates to what the author describes as 'the problem of privacy in public' (Nissenbaum, 2004, p. 559) , where secondary use of 'public' data in other contexts, beyond the visibility of the user, may still breach data-subjects' expectations of privacy. This perspective is reinforced by Palen and Dourish (2003) who argue that 'denying the ability to discern who might be able to see one's action can, in itself, constitute a violation of personal privacy' (p. 132), casting privacy less as a dichotomous issue and more a matter of boundary control.
Equally, it is insufficient to assume that information which leaves the private sphere is by definition public. Nissenbaum (1998) draws upon a contemporary notion of surveillance, concluding that 'theories of privacy should also recognize the systematic relationship between privacy and information is neither intimate nor sensitive and is drawn from public spheres ' (p. 559) . This theory speaks clearly to the pervasive computing context, where the developmental trend tends towards multiple, invisible devices, sensors and systems, woven into the fabric of daily life. The emergence of technology has come to mean that privacy is less about closing a door against intrusion and more about the 'way our publicly observable activities are dispersed over space and time' (Uteck, 2009, p. 91 ) thus incorporating new spatial and temporal dynamics.
On the basis of these positions, expectations of privacy are clearly contingent upon interrelated and mutable factors and boundaries. Pervasive systems blur these boundaries yet further, meaning that awareness of the context within which consent occurs becomes critical in deciding what information should remain private. Consider, for example, the simple case of a wifi bathroom scale, 5 which can capture peoples' weight and body mass index and send this information to a web application. The system can build profiles of individuals and keep track of weight gains and losses. This is a perfectly reasonable item to have in a bathroom, allowing people to keep track of their weight. However, given this is connected to the Internet, the possibility exists for this to be broadcast via Twitter or Facebook. Moreover, the systems' ability to build profiles means that it will most likely capture and build a record of the weights of any visitor to a household who stands on the scale. Thus visitors who guiltily weight themselves after a particularly satisfying dinner party are captured for posterity. Just how this device should be treated, whether it is public or private, and what social conventions are involved in having such a system in the bathroom are raised as questions for the home owner and the visitor alike.
Challenge 7: control, autonomy and privacy management
A further issue arising from the current design of ECMs is their reliance upon the principle of user-control. The sense of control 238 Ewa Luger and Tom Rodden invoked focuses on the provision of a set of mechanisms that allow users to exercise autonomy in managing their privacy. This is set against a background of control as a socio-political phenomena describing a power relationship between and controller and the entities being controlled. Over the past two decades, the media has framed technology-based privacy violations in the socio-legal language of individual rights. From this perspective, the dominant work assumes a liberal cast, as debates construct a binary distinction between the citizen and the state, (Steeves, 2009 ) conceptually reinforcing personal autonomy as a means to securing privacy (Curren and Kaye, 2010) . In practice, control is often used as a synonym for autonomy in the description of most privacy systems. However, even use of autonomy as a concept is limited as it might come from one of the three contextually flawed perspectives; principled autonomy (taken from Kantian thought where individual autonomy should be employed in the common good); individual autonomy (deriving of liberal political and economic thought and relating to individual independence and freedom of choice) and rational autonomy (with an emphasis upon reflective, informed choicemaking, often moving beyond first order desires) (Manson and O'Neill, 2007) .
From the perspective of digital interactions, the term autonomy has yet another interpretation. It is used most commonly as a derivative of individual autonomy. 'Such autonomy can be seen as the control that individuals could, or should, exert over how such data are used by others' (Curren and Kaye, 2010, p. 273) and represents the dominant on-and off-line paradigm of an individuals' right to control of their own data (Schwartz, 2000, p. 820) ; what Altman (1975) defined as the ability to selectively control access to one's self.
However, recent conceptual developments have introduced the notion of dynamism in that contemporary informational privacy is about ongoing control. 'A privacy failure is a control failure' (Schneier, 2010) complicated by the highly dynamic and situated nature of technologically mediated interactions, casting privacy management as dynamic and highly circumstantial (Palen and Dourish, 2003) . Steeves (2009) expands upon this understanding, suggesting that privacy is 'a dynamic process of negotiating personal boundaries in intersubjective relations ' (p. 193) ; thus reformulating it as highly contextual.
Privacy as informational control externalizes the concept from the individual and fails to fully acknowledge the potential impact of a society under constant surveillance, thus opening the door to societal violations (Steeves, 2009) . Where systems gather new types of personal information, the protection of privacy becomes intrinsic to the individual and relates more closely to human rights. From this perspective, privacy has a specific social value, currently unrecognized within informational control discourses. The concept of autonomy, however, subtly brings the focus back and allows the individual to 'actively participate in determining [their] own behavior without external influence' (Partala and Kallinen, 2012 p. 26) , returning agency to the individual.
A clearer conceptual distinction between control and autonomy is particularly important if we are to develop nuanced understandings of the management of the self within pervasive systems. This is particularly critical if we consider the ways in which such systems both derive highly personal data and make non-sensitive data personal, necessitating the need for more sophisticated user-management of identity. Social technologies render digital information as intrinsic to the individual; information is no longer external and owned but constituent and intimate (Floridi, 2006) . Technology fundamentally alters sociality, conflating information with the self in new and emerging ways and making it impossible to abandon informational understandings of privacy. From this perspective, any informational violation is a violation of the self. 'Any society in which no informational privacy is possible is one in which no personal identity can be maintained' (p. 111).
Ultimately, therefore, it is insufficient to rely upon traditional notions of control as the drivers of future consent management design. Pervasive systems are likely to be instrumental in the construction and maintenance of identity and, as such, the future system design must be sensitive to the implications of data generation and the autonomy of the user. Consider, for example, the growing turn to affective computing systems that seek to either sense or infer emotional state, often using physiological data drawn from the body (e.g. detecting thrill (Schnädelbach et al., 2008) ). Separating this form of data from the person, as is common in current approaches, seems rather odd. If the system is aware of your mood, your anxiety levels, and even your reaction to friends, colleagues and relationship partners, then the system is linked to the individual rather than their data. This makes the ways in which you manage that relationship, between the system and the user, more nuanced than that afforded by a focus upon explicit control and permission.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The body of work covering digital systems and consent has already seen a shift away from the medical research conceptions that framed so much early thought. Arguably, as within bioethics, the practice of securing consent has drifted from its theoretical foundations and what is emerging bears some comparison with the reconfiguration suggested by Manson and O'Neill (2007) bib33. Subsequently, there exists a need to reframe consent within digital systems in order to match more closely the dynamics of technological developments, practice and user-behaviour.
The act of consent is significantly more than a box-ticking exercise. It is a powerful mechanism for privacy management, an exercise of individual autonomy and a point of agency for the user. However, this understanding is currently impoverished within the on-line context and this partial view, of consent as a trivial moment of transactional disclosure, is in danger of simply transferring to the context of pervasive systems. Without careful consideration at this stage, the increased interweaving of the personal and the public within complex, data-driven systems will bring us to a crisis of consent.
In this paper, we have reflected on the need to reconsider our current perspectives on consent. The seven challenges presented by pervasive computing serve to illustrate that the bioethical tradition, which has informed our accepted conceptual framings, no longer sits comfortably within the trajectory of technological advances.
In light of this argument is clear that we need to reconsider (a) consent both conceptually and in application, (b) the ways in which pervasive systems might be reformulated to meet these new consent requirements, (c) the design of ECMs in light of the challenges of pervasive systems and (d) the form, timings and content of the propositions that inform the user.
This leads us to question, what next? What should designers of pervasive systems make of the various debates and discussions we have highlighted in this paper and what does this mean, going forward, for us all. The first and most obvious thing to say is that people need to be aware of the discussions we have highlighted, which span multiple research disciplines and traditions, and seek to understand the on-going challenges to existing conceptions of privacy and consent. Many of these discussions are nuanced and implicate a broad range of perspectives. The challenge now is how to convey the crucial features of this debate without being overly reductionist in doing so. We would like to offer the following recommendations as a means to promote further research and continue debate in this critical area.
Whilst some research has already touched upon these issues (Friedman et al., 2005; Bonnici and Coles-Kemp, 2010 ), a more targeted and consistent approach is required. If the design of systems is to meet the requirements of the consent process, this must proceed from a common conceptual foundation. However, even before such developments can occur, a systematic and empirically informed reconfiguration of consent must take place. Such reconfiguration is likely to question whether the current model of informed consent is indeed appropriate, and how systems can be better designed to meet the challenges of the current technological trajectory.
To this end, this review calls for further research in the following areas: (i) development of a more nuanced understanding of both 'consent' and 'control' to underpin the design of future systems, (ii) a situated exploration of user expectation with respect to potential points of consent, (iii) systems design that promotes user understandings of data flows, usage and sharing within increasingly pervasive systems, (iv) a review of existing notice mechanisms to better support propositional statements informing the consent act and (v) the ongoing development of specific design principles in line with the following recommendations:
• ECMs must cease to be designed around 'moments in time ' and allow for negotiation
The dominance of the contractual form of consent (a priori) is predicated on a model of interaction where people are informed of the activity they are undertaking in terms of intention, and subsequently indicate their agreement. This moment is unlikely to clearly exist in pervasive systems. Consequently, we need to shift to a continuous perspective on consent where there are a series of on-going instances, where users are made aware of the consent proposition, and offered the opportunity to review and amend their response.
• Systems should enable establishment of user expectations and development of norms
As we recognize that notions of privacy are both contingent upon context and mutable over time, so it becomes clear that binary, static consent mechanisms cannot hope to meet user privacy expectations. In order to meet such demands, consent systems need to help users to make meaningful judgments about what is private and what is public. Even where a system relies upon implicit consent, this will first require the assisted establishment of expectations and norms so that users know what to expect in similar use scenarios. Therefore, further investigation is required into how pervasive systems can provide appropriate presentations of information flow and use and how and when should this be communicated to the user.
• Systems should be sensitive to third party interactions
The inherently shared nature of pervasive systems means that we need to be sensitive to third-party interactions and what it means to consent. As more technologies are embedded into the world we share, we need to consider not only what consent might mean directly for individuals, but also what it means for those who visit their smart homes or borrow their intelligent cars. How do we involve third parties in consent by alerting them to the nature of pervasive environments and how might we manage the implicit transfer of consent involved in this form of sharing?
• We should move beyond designing for user control towards designing for user autonomy:
The concept of individual autonomy is central to consent but has been reduced to the binary notion of user control. However, this very notion is open to change in pervasive systems where people might have a host of autonomous software systems operating on their behalf. The challenge here is how consent might be understood when interaction combines users and software agents. For example, to what extent can autonomous software agents give consent on behalf of people they represent? Similarly, what responsibilities might software agents have in informing users when they choose to act?
As a final comment it is worth stating that these are an illustrative initial set of issues to promote and encourage reflection and debate for those involved in the shaping of pervasive computing. They are not intended to be an exhaustive set of concerns. In all likelihood consent will be co-shaped 240 Ewa Luger and Tom Rodden by a number of technical, social and legal concerns and the dialogue between these needs to be established as we move forward.
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